Tuesday, 18 December 2007

The nature of consciousness

Churchland's postulation of the truth of “Chomskian” linguistics is as integral to Churchland’s 1994 publication as to Churchland’s 1984 one. It is apparent that Churchland has presumed the truth of Chomsky's position in Matter and Consciousness (Churchland, 1984). In this, Churchland takes as fact the precision attached to a “Chomskian” elucidation of “conscious intelligence”.

In respect of an artificial conscious through Artificial Intelligence, Churchland, (1984, p 100) argues that consciousness results in “rules [of arithmetic] you already know ... So you already possess a self conscious command of one formal system. And given that you can think at all, you also have at least some tacit command of the general logic of propositions as well, which is another formal system. What is more interesting is that any formal system can be automated”.

He further supposes that “artificial languages [ BASIC, PASCAL etc.] are much simpler in structure and content than human natural language, but the differences may be differences only of degree, ... the theoretical work of Noam Chomsky and the generative grammar approach to linguistics have done a great deal to explain the human capacity for language-use in terms that invite simulation by computer”. (Churchland, P. 1984, p 16).

This enthymeme is presupposed in its conclusion but leads to a system such as Chomsky's rules. When we discern intrinsically, then except if one has such instinctive acquaintance of the methods language and, subsequently, contemplation, and by association, consciousness is unattainable.

“… But we lack any insight into the nature of consciousness” (Chomsky, N. 1995, p 36).

  • Chomsky, N. (1995) “The Minimalist Program”. MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass.
  • Churchland, P. (1984) “Matter and Consciousness”. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
  • Churchland, P. (1994) “Review of Searle (1992)” in ‘London Review of Books’, 12th May, 1994.

1 comment:

Craig S Wright said...

Please note that in this posting I am "consciously" providing nothing to the psychodynamic theory of Alfred Adler, Carl G. Jung or any other of their cohort.

I am ignoring the Individual Psychology as a theory of personality from Adler, Jung's "Psychology of Dementia Praecox" (1907) which upholds the Freudian psychodynamic falacy and even the concept in "positive psychology of the psychodynamic conception of flow or current.

Even "Cognitive psychodynamics" though a conceptual melting pot of Jungian psychodynamic precepts, cognitive psychology and neuroscience is but a mystic step into the the Aristolian qualitative haze.

I am biased towards the quantitative in case you have not made this presupposition.